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Since the 1990s many emerging countries have adopted a fixed exchange-rate peg 
vis-a-vis a reserve currency in order to cope with economic imbalances such as buoyant 
inflation, high unemployment or staggering economic growth. However, after a period 
of economic stabilisation and prosperity, overheating effects showed up in several 
countries that were often coupled with difficulties in the banking and~or the real estate 
sector. Sticking with a fixed peg, the likelihood of a currency crisis increased. 
The case of Argentina shows that even with a currency board it is difficult to restore 
confidence if a crisis has already been developing for several years. This article presents 
an economic analysis of the Argentina crisis. 
M any emerging countries have adopted the strategy of fostering economic growth by 
encouraging the influx of foreign capital. Under 
globalised financial markets where capital is highly 
mobile and can be transferred from one place to 
another with small transaction costs, developing 
countries have to create favourable conditions for 
investors in order to attract foreign funds. The 
enhanced competition in financial markets is mainly 
due to deregulation, the suspension of capital restric- 
tions, the creation of derivatives and technological 
progress in telecommunication and computer 
systems. 
Emerging countries usually possess comparative 
cost advantages that arise from cheap and well- 
trained labour, abundant resources of minerals and 
land. In order to promote economic development, 
foreign capital is imperative for the financing of invest- 
ments. Such countries were compelled to liberalise 
their markets, allowing foreign investors to acquire 
substantial shares in local enterprises, and permitting 
foreign banks and financial corporations to open 
branches, grant credits and to deal freely in local 
equity and obligations markets without discrimination. 
In order to gain the confidence of investors, emerging 
countries had to pursue a disciplined policy that 
would stabilise the economy and the value of money. 
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These countries usually experienced periods of high 
rates of inflation and unemployment, imbalances in 
the government sector and external deficits. To 
stabilise the economy countries often chose to peg 
the domestic currency to a reserve currency. Fixed 
exchange rates help a country to discipline its 
economic policy and to restore the confidence of 
investors. 
The Danger of Currency Crises 
In many emerging countries such measures were 
used to conquer unstable situations and to foster 
economic growth. Mexico, the East Asian Countries, 
Russia and Brazil used different forms of pegs to 
solve economic problems before falling into banking 
and currency crises in the 1990s. 1 What are the 
reasons that such events occur? Why is a peg 
condemned to fail even if initial benefits seem to 
justify it? 
The story is usually as follows: given the peg and 
the liberalisation of financial markets, huge (short- 
term) capital flows will enter an emerging country 
because domestic interest rates are larger than 
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foreign ones and the perspectives of high economic 
growth attract foreign investors, especially if industrial 
countries are experiencing a recession. The influx of 
capital increases the liquidity of domestic banks and 
financial corporations thereby stimulating credit 
creation. 
The central bank accumulates foreign exchange 
reserves and if it does not sterilise them, money 
supply increases. Since in emerging countries 
monetary institutions, the supervision of the banking 
system and the imposition of risk management rules 
are not fully developed, credits are often not directed 
to their best use. In addition, there is usually 
widespread corruption and nepotism. 
Under globalisation, domestic financial markets 
and institutions hould be safeguarded by appropriate 
reregulation, e.g. the Basle rules for risk management 
and bank supervision. In many emerging countries, 
speculative bubbles develop in the real estate and 
banking sector leading to steep price rises and a 
subsequent crash in those markets. This raises the 
number of bad credits that will not be repayed, 
leading to substantial osses for banks. As a conse- 
quence a large amount of bank deposits are 
withdrawn that cannot be backed by selling assets or 
calling back loans. Interest rates climb to high levels 
reflecting increased risks. Even if the central bank 
buys out some commercial banks, many of them have 
to be closed. With this course of events investors 
doubt that the government will maintain the peg of its 
currency. Pessimistic expectations lead them to buy 
foreign exchange at the fixed rate. 
Another problem concerns the growing indebt- 
edness of domestic firms and banks in foreign 
currency. There is a considerable danger that the 
elimination of the peg will substantially increase the 
amount of foreign currency debt and corresponding 
interest payments in domestic money. A buoyant 
demand for foreign exchange is very likely. 
Most investors are short-sighted and look for 
speculative opportunities that are offered to them by 
portfolios of financial assets under global conditions. 
Since short-term funds can be easily invested and 
withdrawn this makes it very difficult for the 
government o defend its currency peg. Even slight 
signs of fear that a country might abandon its peg will 
trigger a speculative attack. This is a so-called (safe) 
one-way speculation. 
Different Ways to Peg a Currency 
Emerging countries have used different forms of 
pegs. A fixed peg against the US-dollar was chosen 
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by East Asian countries such as Thailand, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, South Korea and Singapore 
before the currency crises of these countries in 
1997/98. A crawling peg with pre-announced devalu- 
ation steps was used instead by Mexico and Brazil 
before the outbreak of their currency crises in 1995 
and 1999 respectively. Other countries, e.g. Hong 
Kong and Argentina, adopted a currency board 
system vis-a-vis the US-dollar in 1983 and 1991 
respectively. Dollarisation, with the US-dollar as legal 
tender, was chosen in 2000 by Ecuador in the 
aftermath of its currency crisis. 
How do these pegs differ from each other and what 
implications do they have on the likelihood that a 
currency crisis could occur? Any kind of currency 
peg, even if the government is determined to defend 
it, can be reversed. We can distinguish between a free 
move to flexible exchange rates or one forced by 
heavy losses of foreign exchange reserves. However, 
dollarisation or membership of a currency union are 
only reversible at a very high cost. The different forms 
of a peg can be listed according to increasing 
commitments to bind the domestic currency to the 
reserve currency: crawling peg, fixed peg, currency 
board, currency union and dollarisation. In this order 
the credibility of the peg increases. 
Currency Boards 
A currency board is a monetary institution whose 
base money (Mo) has to be backed 100% by an inter- 
national reserve currency. There is a fixed exchange 
rate between the domestic and the reserve currency. 
A currency board aims to reach full substitutability 
(convertibility) of these currencies in order to transfer 
the reputation of the reserve currency to the domestic 
one. Strict rules for monetary and fiscal policies are 
necessary to make this transfer possible. Discrete 
monetary measures or the financing of budget deficits 
by money creation must be excluded. In order to 
introduce a currency board, a sufficient amount of 
foreign money should be available. Although base 
money is backed 100% by foreign currency, this is not 
usually the case for extended money supplies such as 
M1 or M2 because of secondary money creation. 
Therefore a currency crisis may develop even in a 
country with a currency board. There are some disad- 
vantages to a currency board system. It can neither 
make use of monetary policy, nor take on a "lender of 
last resort"-function and there is a substantial oss of 
seigniorage gains. With a currency board, procyclical 
behaviour is accentuated: during good times capital 
inflows increase, lower interest rates and initiate a 
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boom; if economic conditions deteriorate or if 
pessimistic expectations of investors are self-fulfilling, 
capital flows are reversed and interest rates rise, 
thereby causing a recession. One would suppose that 
a currency board is less vulnerable to currency crisis 
than a simple fixed peg. However, the case of 
Argentina shows clearly that a currency board is not 
immune to crises. 
The Argentina Crisis 
When Argentina suffered from a hyperinflation that 
amounted to 5648% between June 1989 and June 
1990, Carlos Menem's new goverment introduced a 
currency board in 1991 (also called the convertibility 
plan) against the US-dollar with the parity 1 Peso = 1 
US$. The money base was covered 100% by foreign 
exchange, gold, and dollar-denominated ebt of the 
Argentinian state. The demanded percentage of 
foreign exchange, however, was only 66% although 
the actual coverage remained on a 95% level up to 
1996. To maintain its currency board, Argentina had to 
pursue monetary and fiscal discipline. Financing 
public sector deficits by printing money was 
prohibited and the lender-of-last-resort function of the 
monetary authorities was curtailed. As a conse- 
quence, the inflation rate fell to 10% p.a. in 1993 (see 
Figure 1). Full convertibility of the peso was estab- 
lished for both current and capital transactions. This 
increased transparency in the economy and re-estab- 
lished investors' confidence as foreign exchange risk 
seemed to be absent. 
The introduction of the currency board was coupled 
by the liberalisation of foreign trade, deregulation, 
privatisation and a reform of the financial system. A 
trade reform was pursued to reduce distortions and to 
integrate the economy with the world markets. Export 
tariffs and nontariff import barriers were almost elimi- 
nated by the end of 1991. With deregulation, the 
government abolished all price controls, removed 
barriers to entry in wholesale and retail trade and 
relaxed regulated access to professional services. 
From 1991-1994 the Argentinian government priva- 
tised some 90 % of all state enterprises for the equiv- 
alent of more than US$ 20 bn. The privatisation 
brought about considerable gains in economic 
efficiency together with a reduction of employment in 
this sector. The transformation of the financial system 
improved banking and financial intermediation. In 
order to avoid financial crises, banks' reserve require- 
ments and capitalisation ratios were lifted. Financial 
markets were liberalised, eliminating the discrimi- 
nation of foreign investors, banks and firms. As a 
result of these reforms, real GDP-growth was 5% p.a. 
on the average during 1991-1998 (see Figure 1). 
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In spite of the strong reduction of Argentinian 
inflation, it remained significantly higher than that of 
its main trading partners. Together with an extended 
period of revaluation of the dollar against most other 
currencies, the fixed peg to the dollar led to a real 
overvaluation of the peso that substantially reduced 
Argentina's competitiveness. Imports soared while 
exports grew less, leading to trade balance and 
current account deficits (see Figure 2). In order to 
finance these deficits Argentina accumulated external 
debt. 
While the budget deficit remained low up to 1992 
due to privatisation gains, it has climbed strongly 
since then (see Figure 2). From 1992 to 1998 public 
debts doubled. The deterioration of public finance 
was reinforced by a change in the social security 
system where a complementary private capitalised 
scheme was introduced that led to a substantial 
reduction in entrepreneurs' contributions. Although 
this reform resulted in a reduction in the future liabil- 
ities of the public system, the budget deficit rose 
during the transition period by an amount equal to the 
contributions shifted to the private pension system. 
The deficit was aggravated by tax evasion of firms 
and widespread corruption. Government spending 
increased mainly at the provincial level. The provincial 
governments were spending far more than they were 
collecting in taxes. Much of this spending concerned 
government payrolls. In spite of privatisation, in some 
provinces more than 60% of the labour force was 
employed in the public sector. This resulted in distor- 
tions on the labour market. Because of the currency 
board, Argentina could not finance its budget deficit 
by printing money but only by credits via financial 
markets that would exert fiscal discipline on the 
government. Increasing indebtedness led to rising 
interest rates and higher debt service. 
The dollar peg and favourable perspectives of 
investors caused a substantial inflow of (mainly short- 
term) capital. This helped to overcome the capital 
shortage in financing economic growth. Dollar credits 
were increasingly demanded by the government, 
domestic private firms and banks because of lower 
interest rates abroad. In emerging countries financing 
mainly takes the form of bank credits rather than 
financial market instruments. 
As of 1998 Argentina experienced a severe 
recession that was accompanied by increasing 
unemployment. The real overvaluation of the peso 
and the substantial devaluation of its main trading 
partners' currencies (e.g. the Brasilian real devaluated 
about 50% against the dollar in 1999) deteriorated 
Argentina's competitiveness, which reduced 
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aggregate demand. Growing budget deficits and high 
external debts led to a sharp rise in domestic interest 
rates, reflecting higher risk premiums. This had a 
negative effect on private investment. 
In order to maintain the fixed peg it was necessary 
to pursue fiscal discipline. Unfortunately, restrictive 
fiscal measures aggravated the recession, substan- 
tially reducing real GDP-growth and leading to 
deflation. While under flexible exchange rates 
competitiveness can be restored by devaluation 
without harm (with the exception of cumulative deval- 
uations) with a fixed peg it can only be improved 
through the painful process of deflation. The IMF 
supported Argentina's austere fiscal policy measures 
in spite of its severe economic consequences. 
Facing the downward spiral of the Argentinian 
economy, the IMF and some industrial countries 
agreed to provide a rescue package of US$ 42bn. in 
December 2000. Payments would only be effected if 
progress was made in economic policy according to 
predetermined requirements. Sticking to the fixed 
peg, Argentina was obliged to follow a strict fiscal 
regime that deepened its recession. Because of 
growing budget imbalances the de la Rea government 
introduced the "zero-deficit" policy in July 2001. 
Government expenses should be brought into line 
with tax receipts - yet with decreasing taxes owing to 
recession it became increasingly difficult to reduce 
public expenditures. Through restrictive policy, 
aggregate demand and supply were further reduced. 
In order to limit interest payments and repayments on 
public debt, the government offered its domestic 
creditors to exchange obligations for longer-term 
credits with reduced interest rates and to guarantee 
these credits by tax receipts. Since the price of 
government obligations had already been adjusted to 
50% of its nominal value by the market, most 
creditors accepted that offer. The government 
planned to negotiate the restructuring of debt held by 
foreign creditors in a similar way. 
Because of the protracted recession, growing 
interest rates and the reluctance of banks to renew or 
to grant additional credits, many firms were pushed 
into default, thereby aggravating unemployment. 
Together with delayed payments of salaries and 
reduced welfare payments poverty grew substantially. 
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In spite of the sound banking structure and high 
reserves to cope with financial difficulties, the credit 
crunch and pessimistic expectations induced the 
public increasingly to withdraw bank deposits (the 
total amount being some 65 bn. pesos) during 2001. 
In order to avoid illiquidity and insolvency of the 
banking system, the government decided in 
December 2001 to limit the withdrawal of deposits to 
1000 pesos per month and person. This measure of 
protection against bank runs was called "corralito". In 
addition, the government limited the amount of dollars 
to be taken out of the country, thereby implementing 
capital controls to guarantee the fixed peg. 
These policy measures, together with the IMF's 
refusal to pay a credit share of US$1.3 bn. in early 
December 2001, provoked heavy protests, plundering 
and vandalism in Argentina. As a consequence, the 
minister of economics Domingo Cavallo and president 
Fernando de la R(Ja resigned. Within two weeks five 
presidents were in office. Finally Eduardo Duhalde 
was elected president on January 1, 2002. White 
his predecessors defended the fixed parity, Duhalde 
decided on January 5 to devalue the peso by 29% 
against the dollar in order to improve the country's 
competitiveness. The new parity, 1 US$ = 1.4 peso, 
was applied to commercial trade, while the free- 
market exchange rate plunged to 1.7 peso per US$. 
The strong devaluation of the peso, together with 
the freezing of the government's dollar debts, 
concluded the country's default. After some weeks of 
a split exchange rate the "free" peso devalued more 
than 55% against the dollar (1US$=2.3 peso). On 
February 11 the government decided to float the 
peso, maintaining the "corralito" and the capital 
restrictions in order not to cause a disruption of the 
financial system. These measures were intended to 
reduce the likelihood of speculative attacks on the 
peso. The central bank's foreign exchange reserves 
(which amounted to US$ 17 bn.) could be used to 
stabilise the peso. Private dollar debts were further 
allowed to be converted to equal amounts in pesos 
without limitation. 
Figure 3 shows the different phases of the 
Argentina crisis including economic factors and policy 
measures. The dynamic structure and feed-backs are 
outlined without stressing strict causality. 
Conclusion 
The introduction of the currency board certainly 
had merits for bringing down hyperinflation, restoring 
the confidence of investors and promoting economic 
growth. The liberalisation and deregulation of local 
markets favoured massive inflow of (especially short- 
term) foreign capital. However, the real overvaluation 
of the peso diminished competitiveness, which led to 
rising current account deficits. As budget deficits 
increased, austere fiscal programmes demanded by 
the IMF were applied. Severe recession and deflation 
resulted in a economic downturn. To stop that 
process it would have been necessary to allow for 
some flexibility of the exchange rate at an earlier point 
in time. 
The elimination of the currency board, the devalu- 
ation and the subsequent floating of the peso 
certainly came too late. If a country is already experi- 
encing a severe crisis, such measures may have a 
negative repercussion effect. With increased uncer- 
tainty, economic agents are more sceptical about the 
course of economic policy and are reluctant to invest. 
Capital controls impede necessary capital inflows and 
aggravate economic development. The confidence of 
investors is not easy to restore, especially with regard 
to the country's default. Unfortunately, so far there are 
no default rules for countries that could bring about 
an ordered procedure analogous to the private sector. 
In addition, there is a danger of imported inflation in 
spite of free capacities in industry. 
Another possibility would have been to move 
straight away to dollarisation, since Argentina was 
already dollarised to a large extent. Such a transition 
could be effected by first devaluing the peso and then 
replacing pesos by dollars at the new exchange rate. 
However, this would presumably not have solved the 
problem of competitiveness in the longer run. 
Although the new stable currency would lead to lower 
interest rates, Argentina could no longer use monetary 
policy as a means of adjusting to specific economic 
changes. Nor could fiscal policy be handled indepen- 
dently. There would be a substantial loss of seigniority 
gains. The value of external debts would not increase, 
with the exception of an initial effect. The danger of 
the country's default would have been reduced but 
not eliminated. 
In general it is very difficult to judge future implica- 
tions of such policy measures given the chaotic 
situation of the country. It is essential to reduce uncer- 
tainty and to restore confidence in Argentina. The 
crisis can only be conquered by changing domestic 
structures, improving institutions and reducing 
corruption, together with international help. The lack 
of reaction by the IMF shows that economic solutions 
are not easy to find in a global context. 
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